Gerry
08-08-2006, 02:45 PM
The US and Israel: a marriage under pressure
Paul Rogers
7 - 8 - 2006
The flaws in Israel's Lebanese war are straining the loyalties of Tel Aviv's most fervent supporters in Washington.
Each of the near-daily columns in this series over the past three weeks have focused on the Lebanon war, albeit with some mention of its connections with Gaza, Iraq and even Afghanistan. A consistent, regrettable assessment has emerged: that the war was unlikely to end soon, and that the various international attempts to force a settlement, including the Rome summit of 26 July 2006, would have little effect.
The approach of the four-week point in the war since its outbreak on 12 July marks yet another of those phases in which diplomacy that might be aimed at a ceasefire is coinciding with an escalation of the war. At a point where the Bush administration is at last willing to see a United Nations Security Council resolution being agreed, it needs to be remembered that the United States still shares Israel's view that this war is essentially about curbing Iran's power in the region.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the UN resolution, as it takes shape, leans markedly towards Israel. This may be just about acceptable to some European powers and even Russia and China, but it will not be accepted by the Lebanese government or Hizbollah, or by public opinion across most of the middle east.
A plan waylaid
Although Israel launched this war in response to a specific and relatively small border violation by Hizbollah, it is an operation that has been planned and rehearsed for months if not years. The security expert Gerald Steinberg of Bar-Ilan University told a leading United States newspaper a week after the war started: "Of all Israel's wars since 1948, this was the one for which Israel was most prepared" (see Matthew Kalman, "Israel set war plan more than a year ago", San Francisco Chronicle, 21 July 2006).
Israel's extensive preparation for the six-day war of 1967 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, makes that a bold claim, but Steinberg elaborates:
"In a sense, the preparation began in May 2000, immediately after the Israeli withdrawal [from southern Lebanon], when it became clear the international community was not going to prevent Hizbollah from stockpiling missiles and attacking Israel. By 2004, the military campaign scheduled to last about three weeks that we're seeing now had already been blocked out and, in the last year or two, it's been simulated and rehearsed across the board".
The San Francisco Chronicle reports that diplomats, military officers and some think-tanks were briefed a year ago or more on the outline of the plans that would comprise an intensive three-week operation: a first-week air assault on Hizbollah's longer-range missiles, command system and logistic support; a second-week assault on individual missile-launcher sites and stores; and a third-week limited ground offensive against what remained. The overall result would be a massively crippled Hizbollah without the need to occupy parts of southern Lebanon. The whole operation bore the hallmark of Israel's chief-of-staff (and former air-force pilot), General Dan Halutz.
The plan has failed in spite of the intensity of the attack. Since the start of the war, the Israeli air force (IAF) has flown 8,700 sorties and attacked 4,600 targets; according to Israeli sources, these have included 260 Hizbollah headquarters and other buildings, sixty bunkers, seventy weapons stores, ninety rocket-launchers, 1,200 launch-sites and roads leading to launch-sites, and "100 suspicious vehicles believed to be carrying rockets or guerrillas" (see Yaakov Katz, "The War in Numbers", Jerusalem Post, 6 August 2006).
Despite this battering, Hizbollah retains around 10,000 missiles, including perhaps a hundred of a longer-range version that can reach deep into Israel and has not been used yet. Far from taking over southern Lebanon up to the Litani river, a pattern has emerged of well-armed Israel Defence forces (IDF) units crossing the border into Lebanon to engage Hizbollah militia and destroy bunkers and weapons, but then retreating back across the border each night.
This approach has been made necessary because of Hizbollah units have become adept at using anti-tank missiles, both against Israeli armour and in targeting IDF who establish posts within the area. On a number of occasions, small Hizbollah units operating in locales they know well have aimed the missiles at houses temporarily occupied by IDF troops. Israeli tactics of intensive aerial bombardment or burning scrubland to deny the Hizbollah units cover have simply not succeeded.
[
Paul Rogers
7 - 8 - 2006
The flaws in Israel's Lebanese war are straining the loyalties of Tel Aviv's most fervent supporters in Washington.
Each of the near-daily columns in this series over the past three weeks have focused on the Lebanon war, albeit with some mention of its connections with Gaza, Iraq and even Afghanistan. A consistent, regrettable assessment has emerged: that the war was unlikely to end soon, and that the various international attempts to force a settlement, including the Rome summit of 26 July 2006, would have little effect.
The approach of the four-week point in the war since its outbreak on 12 July marks yet another of those phases in which diplomacy that might be aimed at a ceasefire is coinciding with an escalation of the war. At a point where the Bush administration is at last willing to see a United Nations Security Council resolution being agreed, it needs to be remembered that the United States still shares Israel's view that this war is essentially about curbing Iran's power in the region.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the UN resolution, as it takes shape, leans markedly towards Israel. This may be just about acceptable to some European powers and even Russia and China, but it will not be accepted by the Lebanese government or Hizbollah, or by public opinion across most of the middle east.
A plan waylaid
Although Israel launched this war in response to a specific and relatively small border violation by Hizbollah, it is an operation that has been planned and rehearsed for months if not years. The security expert Gerald Steinberg of Bar-Ilan University told a leading United States newspaper a week after the war started: "Of all Israel's wars since 1948, this was the one for which Israel was most prepared" (see Matthew Kalman, "Israel set war plan more than a year ago", San Francisco Chronicle, 21 July 2006).
Israel's extensive preparation for the six-day war of 1967 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, makes that a bold claim, but Steinberg elaborates:
"In a sense, the preparation began in May 2000, immediately after the Israeli withdrawal [from southern Lebanon], when it became clear the international community was not going to prevent Hizbollah from stockpiling missiles and attacking Israel. By 2004, the military campaign scheduled to last about three weeks that we're seeing now had already been blocked out and, in the last year or two, it's been simulated and rehearsed across the board".
The San Francisco Chronicle reports that diplomats, military officers and some think-tanks were briefed a year ago or more on the outline of the plans that would comprise an intensive three-week operation: a first-week air assault on Hizbollah's longer-range missiles, command system and logistic support; a second-week assault on individual missile-launcher sites and stores; and a third-week limited ground offensive against what remained. The overall result would be a massively crippled Hizbollah without the need to occupy parts of southern Lebanon. The whole operation bore the hallmark of Israel's chief-of-staff (and former air-force pilot), General Dan Halutz.
The plan has failed in spite of the intensity of the attack. Since the start of the war, the Israeli air force (IAF) has flown 8,700 sorties and attacked 4,600 targets; according to Israeli sources, these have included 260 Hizbollah headquarters and other buildings, sixty bunkers, seventy weapons stores, ninety rocket-launchers, 1,200 launch-sites and roads leading to launch-sites, and "100 suspicious vehicles believed to be carrying rockets or guerrillas" (see Yaakov Katz, "The War in Numbers", Jerusalem Post, 6 August 2006).
Despite this battering, Hizbollah retains around 10,000 missiles, including perhaps a hundred of a longer-range version that can reach deep into Israel and has not been used yet. Far from taking over southern Lebanon up to the Litani river, a pattern has emerged of well-armed Israel Defence forces (IDF) units crossing the border into Lebanon to engage Hizbollah militia and destroy bunkers and weapons, but then retreating back across the border each night.
This approach has been made necessary because of Hizbollah units have become adept at using anti-tank missiles, both against Israeli armour and in targeting IDF who establish posts within the area. On a number of occasions, small Hizbollah units operating in locales they know well have aimed the missiles at houses temporarily occupied by IDF troops. Israeli tactics of intensive aerial bombardment or burning scrubland to deny the Hizbollah units cover have simply not succeeded.
[